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Equity and redress, in and through education, are fundamental commitments of the new South African democratic government 
that ensued in 1994 after a brutal and protracted history of colonial and apartheid segregation and oppression denied the 
majority black population the fundamental right to equitable and quality education. A raft of ambitious and far-reaching 
policies were put in place to achieve these laudable goals. Yet more than 26 years after the ending of colonial and apartheid 
rule, the South African education system, and society in general, remain, far from equal – made apparent by the current 
COVID-19 pandemic. In this paper we take a critical (re)look at South African education governance and funding policies, 
considering why the South African Schools Acts (SASA) and the National Norms and Standards for School Funding (NNSSF), 
first promulgated in 1997 and 1998 and subsequently amended, have not delivered as expected on the promises of equity, 
redistribution and redress. The paper advances conceptual flaws, operational failures and implementation naivety as to why 
these promises have not been realised, advocating for an alternative social justice model for school governance and funding. 
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Introduction 
We start by reconsidering the commitment of the post-apartheid education system to address equity and redress 
in and through the education system and its financing. Emerging from the long shadow of apartheid, the 
transformation of education governance and financing policy was key to achieving the creation of an education 
system which realised the full potential of all children, equipping them with the skills, knowledge and disposition 
to contribute to the social, political and economic development of South Africa. We critically reflect on this 
education governance policy trajectory since 1994, focusing on the key research question which drives this paper: 
How have education governance policies in post-apartheid South Africa conceptualised and institutionalised 
equity and redress in funding and governance and with what effect? In reviewing the education policy trajectory, 
we argue that the policies have failed to deliver on the commitments to equity and redress as promised since the 
ending of apartheid in 1994. Based on this review, we argue for an alternative social justice redistributive model 
of school governance and funding derived from what one of the writers originally called the Fifth Option in 
education governance (Sayed, 2003). We begin with a brief description of the methodology on which the analysis 
is based followed by a review of the literature and outline of the conceptual framework. We then critically examine 
the key policies showing how they fall short in terms of providing equity and redress in and through education. 
We conclude by mapping out key policy agendas integral to the development of a socially just education 
governance and financing agenda for schools in South Africa. 
 
Methodology 
This paper is based on the view that policy construction and development reflects a particular social, economic 
and political context in which differing social forces seek to make and remake the world (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). 
Through a detailed engagement with the content, and structure of South African education governance policies, 
we analyse the social, economic, and political beliefs, values and practice that have informed their construction. 
We specifically pay attention to the two landmark governance policies in South Africa as described below, the 
SASA and the NNSSF first promulgated in 1997 and 1998 respectively and subsequently amended. The detailed 
critical analysis of these written policy texts is based on critical discourse analysis (CDA), examining how 
inequality is reproduced through policy within a given historic, social and political context. CDA aims to go 
beyond a merely descriptive process to examine the ideologies and power reflected in policy texts. In addition to 
the discursive analysis of the education governance policies, we also review relevant empirical data from national 
and provincial education management information systems (EMIS), national and provincial treasuries, educator 
salary data (Persal), and the SNAP Survey of Ordinary Schools. 
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Further, we draw upon reflections from our 
own separate professional engagement in the 
education governance policy formation processes to 
address the issues of equity and redress in and 
through policy. We draw upon the conceptual 
framework of Nancy Fraser (1997, 2009) outlined 
below, to understand how  social justice, particularly 
in relation to redistribution and representation, was 
framed and achieved though post-apartheid South 
African governance and funding policies. 
Collectively, this data offer an opportunity to 
deconstruct the beliefs, assumptions, values and 
socio-political dynamics that have informed 
education governance policy development. 
 
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
Different approaches to policy and policy analysis 
exist (Rizvi, 2006; Sayed & Ahmed, 2015) – each 
tied to different educational approaches. Following 
Rizvi (2006), we argue that policy is not just factual 
but normative and contested. Rather than viewing 
policy texts as neutral, they are inextricably shaped 
by and reflect contexts like the current neo-liberal 
discourses on education. Policy can be understood 
as a value-laden process which is discursive in 
nature (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). We draw from these 
broader conceptualisations of policy in considering 
how approach shapes policy outcomes. 
To advance the debate, we draw on the work of 
Fraser (1997, 2009), which for us refers to the idea 
of social justice as distributional justice, reallocating 
resources accessed solely by the privileged to the 
historically disadvantaged. Moreover, we 
understand the concept as suggesting that while 
policy as the authoritative allocation of values seeks 
to achieve the “sameness” of all, it also affirms and 
recognises the marginalised and subjugated 
identities of the oppressed. To this end, we analyse 
post-apartheid governance policies in relation to: 
• Redistribution, which concerns equity in the 
distribution of education resources and outcomes for 
different groups, particularly the marginalised and 
disadvantaged. 
• Recognition, which concerns respect for and 
affirmation of diversity in education processes and 
content. 
• Representation, which concerns the participation, 
particularly of the excluded, in education governance 
at all levels of the system in policy formulation and 
implementation. 
Key to our framework is engaging with the idea of 
democracy and citizen participation in education 
policy. In South Africa, this is understood in relation 
to the democratisation of access to education policy 
outlined in the National Education Policy Act of 
1996 in the context of a new democratic state. 
However, a stipulation of this policy regards the 
nature of devolved governance and the dynamic that 
was established between the centre and the 
provinces, or decentralised states.i The provisions of 
the Constitution, designed to accommodate a 
semi-federalist, decentralised state, locates fiscal 
control centrally, within an authority responsible for 
disbursing funds to the devolved sites, but with a 
limited monitoring and oversight role (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996). In other words, the national 
state funds, but does not directly deliver or provide 
education and as such, basic education is regarded a 
concurrent power. In this model of democracy, the 
associative bond between the centre and the sites is 
created through a process of juridification (Sayed, 
2003). This involves the central Ministry of 
Education promulgating norms that are allowed in 
legislation. Accordingly, legislation facilitates the 
monitoring and regulation of internal state actors. As 
such, juridification is characterised by complex 
lower dynamics between the centre and provinces 
fraught with conflict from the political arena to the 
judiciary. In the semi-federal devolutionary 
impulses, the state, as shown below, reflects the key 
defining moments of educational restructuring in the 
international context, namely choice and 
participation.ii 
 
Contextualising school governance and funding 
policy change in post-apartheid education: Moving 
towards equity and redress 
In this section we provide a brief historicised 
synopsis of the genesis of SASA and the associated 
NNSSF. The policies are to be read in conjunction 
because of how and how much different schools are 
resourced and financed. 
The governance and funding of South African 
schools after the end of apartheid can be traced as 
far back as the period immediately pre-dating its 
demise when the National Party administration 
created Model B and C (Grant Lewis & Motala, 
2004; Sayed, 2003). These proposals, igniting a 
strong commitment to education devolution, became 
core to the education negotiation strategy of the 
apartheid government during the transition 
discussion in the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA). At the same time, Sayed (2003, 
2016) points to the devolutionary impulses of the 
African National Congress (ANC) and allies born 
from it, the experiences of people’s education and 
grassroots involvement in the anti-apartheid 
struggle. In a sense, the negotiated settlement 
between 1990–1994 resulted in, notwithstanding 
diverse ideological and political orientation, an 
agreed commitment to education decentralisation 
and devolution. The shared consensus for devolution 
was accompanied by an approach to transition in 
which the idea of stability, particularly stability in 
education, arose as an overarching concern. Intense 
debates took place about decentralisation and self-
managing schools, with a view evolving that 
localised control and governance through 
decentralised school funding would lead to equity, 
efficiency and redress. 
The devolutionary commitment to education 
governance and concomitant concern for education 
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stability were arguably the foundational approach of 
the key governance and funding policies in 
post-apartheid South Africa, namely, the Schools 
Act enacted in 1996 and amended in 2003, and the 
NNSSF, enacted in 1998 and amended in 2006. 
In order to further engage and enfranchise local 
communities, the SASA (Republic of South Africa, 
1996) extended considerable autonomy, including 
conveying the status of juristic persons, to newly 
created school governing bodies (SGBs). These 
were established in every school and made the 
school principal, along with elected representatives, 
the most important stakeholders. SASA is 
responsible for including admission, language 
policy and, perhaps most vital, the power to appoint 
both educators and non-educator staff in those 
schools where fees are charged. Ahmed and Sayed 
(2009), Mestry (2012) and Van Dyk and White 
(2019) note that the SASA has created two types of 
SGBs. The first are Section 20 schools with limited 
power over funding, including how they spend the 
resources transferred to them as schools, and 
consequently limited in their management abilities 
and mandate. In contrast, Section 21 SGB schools 
applying for additional powers are those that have 
fairly full control of their funds, including the funds 
raised by school fees, and can appoint educators, 
procure and pay for services, and determine the 
school extracurricular activities. SASA, in both its 
original and amended form, has established a two-
tier SGB structure with those serving poorer schools 
having limited management control and autonomy. 
Notwithstanding the differences between these 
two types of SGBs and schools, SASA’s policy logic 
privileges parental control over schools as it 
suggests they are heavily invested in these 
arrangements. The devolution of education authority 
to school communities by the SASA is premised on 
the idea that those parents or guardians are primary 
beneficiaries and so in the case of fee charging, 
similar to paying a user charge, should have the 
power to manage schools as they see fit, subject to 
certain regulations. 
Since the original SASA in 1997, the state has 
redefined governance policies. For instance, since 
2002, SGBs have not been consulted about issues 
around staff placement. Such arrangements are now 
provided for by the 2002 Education Laws 
Amendment Act (ELAA) and fall under the 
jurisdiction of the provinces (The Presidency, 
Republic of South Africa, 2002). Further, since the 
1996 SASA, the act has been amended, as not all 
schools charge school fees. Other amendments 
include changes to the ELAA, which extend the 
authority and responsibility of the principal. 
The NNSSF, a conjoint policy with SASA, 
originally introduced in October 1998 (Department 
of Education [DoE], 1998) and subsequently 
amended in 2006, also required a change to SASA. 
It provides guidelines for how provinces should fund 
schools, directing them to spend at least 60% of the 
budget on poorer schools and providing for fee 
exemption eligibility in fee charging schools based 
on income. Key to the financing approach of this 
policy is a determination of the poverty ranking of 
each school based on income levels, dependency 
ratios and literacy rates in the surrounding 
community (the five-tier quintile system). The 
NNSSF originally allowed all schools to charge 
school fees. An amended NNSSF (DoE, 2006) was 
developed to address some of the effects of this 
policy and increase access to at least some schools 
which were classified fee-free, mainly in quintiles 1 
to 2.iii This was amended in 2010 to include quintile 
3 schools in the no-fee school category, 
encompassing approximately 60% of all schools in 
South Africa. These schools are allocated a larger 
disbursement by the Provincial Education 
Department to compensate for the funds lost as a 
result of the new no-fee policy. Schools that charge 
fees in quintiles 4 and 5 but enrol learners who are 
fee exempt are liable for a block grant-based 
allocation up to the maximum allocation of a 
learner’s costs in a no-fee school (Department of 
Basic Education [DBE], Republic of South Africa, 
2015). Although no-fee schools are identified at 
provincial level, guidance on determining this status 
is nationally uniform and based on three poverty 
indicators: income, unemployment rate and level of 
education of the community. 
The amendments to both NNSSF and SASA 
signalled a significant policy shift. The government 
policy of schools charging fees was no longer viable 
as originally proposed in SASA 1996, and thus for 
many schools that original idea – that the “governing 
body of a public school must take all reasonable 
measures within its means to supplement the 
resources supplied by the state in order to improve 
the quality of education provided by the school to all 
learners at the school” (Republic of South Africa, 
1996:24) – no longer held true. The revised NNSSF 
also stipulated stricter rules around facilitating 
access to fee-charging schools for children without 
sufficient means to pay those fees. Exemptions were 
to be granted according to a codified set of criteria 
and procedures.iv 
The logic of fee charging, parental choice and 
devolved school governance represents a particular 
insertion of the private into the public (Sayed & 
Motala, 2012). The private is inserted into the public 
as central to how the state provides education and 
how the middle class secures the local school site as 
a form of semi-private schooling without having to 
leave the public sector. The education governance 
system in South Africa was reconfigured to ensure 
that the private is an integral component of the state 
provision of education to assure quality and equity, 
retaining the middle class as advocates of reform and 
accountability.
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Findings and Discussion 
Unravelling the Education Governance and 
Financing Policy Logic of Equity and Redress in 
SASA and NNSSF 
As sketched above, South Africa has adhered to a 
model of school governance and funding since the 
end of apartheid in 1994, which has sought to 
introduce a neo-liberal prescription of user charges 
in education on one hand (though amended in 2006 
to render schools in quintiles 1 to 3 no-fee schools, 
as discussed later), and an ultra-hyper-individualist 
“parent as consumer of education” approach to 
school governance, with strong school choice and 
market orientation in allocating places tempered by 
the idea of soft zoning, on the other. We argue that 
this was more than a simplistic realisation of neo-
liberalism as some researchers and scholars have 
suggested in the past. It was premised on a most 
particular conception of equity and redress 
buttressed by the best principles of participatory 
democracy using Fraser (1997) and Fraser and 
Honneth’s (2003) theory of social justice. 
Fraser’s (1997) conception of social justice 
argues for equity along two axes: representation and 
redistribution. In governance and funding policies, 
representation was core to the logic of devolutionary 
impulses of the SASA. Holding SGBs responsible 
for school governance and for key education 
decisions enabled parents, the majority members of 
SGBs, to hold power of school decision making, 
albeit within some limits. Recognising the 
differential capacity of SGBs, SASA in its 
implementation of the devolved school governance 
models delineated two categories of schools: those 
deemed Section 21 and those deemed Section 20. 
Mestry (2018) notes that Section 21 schools, which 
in South Africa are primarily wealthy quintile 4 and 
5 schools, have greater power to determine their own 
affairs, a power which includes exclusive 
management of their finances, whether coming from 
government or from their own school fees or 
donations (Mestry, 2018). In contrast, Section 20 
schools may have democratic SGBs, but they are 
constrained by very limited powers. They are, in the 
main, dependent on education officials and school 
leadership for many of the core decisions 
surrounding education and schooling.v 
The principle of fee charging appears on the 
surface to be a classic World Bank user-charge 
model (Ahmed & Sayed, 2009). However, in South 
Africa, this somewhat neo-liberal governance 
prescription is turned on its head as the user charge 
is deployed as a mechanism to effect redress and 
equity in and through education in several ways. 
Firstly, the quintile ranking of all schools in South 
Africa, which accompanied the NNSSF in 1998, 
determined that those schools in wealthier quintiles 
(mainly 4 and 5) with higher fees would receive less 
financing from government for their operating 
expenses, including payment of telephones and 
other running costs. In doing this, the state was able 
to effectively argue a form of redress for equity 
purposes in that resources were being disbursed 
disproportionately in favour of poorer schools 
serving marginalised learners. 
Secondly, redress and equity in the form of 
access to such wealthier schools were guaranteed to 
those who could not afford fees, by the fee 
exemption policy prescribed by the NNSSF in 1998 
and further tightened in the 2006 amendments to the 
policy. 
Thirdly, redress and equity were achieved by 
the principle of equalisation of expenditure. In other 
words, as observed by scholars such as Motala and 
Carel (2019) and Sayed and Motala (2012), the key 
funding characteristic of post-apartheid education 
expenditure was that it was norm-based primarily on 
the number of learners in a school, with built-in 
equity measures for distributing resources and 
capital expenditure. Further, the provincial 
“equitable share” formula ensured that the poverty 
of the provinces was an overall factor in tax revenue 
disbursement across provinces. In these ways, the 
key argument for the state was that SASA and the 
NNSSF had put into play a policy logic to achieve 
equity and redress while crucially allowing for 
school choice and control by those who could afford 
to pay fees. In Fraser’s (2009) terms, the NNSSF 
laid the basis for the redistribution of resources in 
post-apartheid South Africa in how resources were 
distributed for those in wealthier schools and 
neighbourhoods and exemption for those unable to 
afford, and in the mechanisms of school choice: 
mobility for those who were able to do so. Equity, 
redress and justice are thus conceived as properties 
of individuals which need historical rectification so 
that all could be, sometime in the future, treated the 
same. However, justice as differential distribution 
stands in contrast to the notion of redress as 
uniformity and standardisation across the education 
system. 
In essence, the governance of semi-private 
schooling is one in which middle class users of the 
service are able to top up on public funding beyond 
their tax contributions. Redress as a policy 
imperative thus found a natural policy alignment 
with the idea that the middle class could be charged 
fees for achieving the quality of schooling which 
they deemed necessary for a good educational 
system.vi In one sense then, the post-apartheid 
governance and funding formula makes possible the 
attainment of social justice as represented in the 
27,000 democratic SGBs encouraging the 
participation of parents and local community 
members. It also facilitates redistribution through 
the commitment to equity and redress in the 
financing of schools, by using fee charging as a 
mechanism to direct resources where needed, and 
through equalisation of expenditure using non-
discrimination norm-based criteria, with funding 
following the school and not the learner. 
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Yet institutional class, race and gender 
bifurcation is coloured around the edges. Schools in 
neighbourhoods that witnessed a flight of the white 
and wealthy population into rich suburbs or gated-
living communities created a new generation of 
commuter schools in which the wealthy have exited 
from certain schools, essentially abandoning these to 
the marginalised and underclass. Additionally, in the 
South African context, particularly in the Western 
Cape, these have increasingly become the schools 
for migrants from other African countries. 
Thus, while the system is bifurcated, there is a 
fluidity in school movement in South Africa, 
described by Chisholm (2004) as “racial hopping”, 
in which wealthy and middle-class Black parents 
leave townships to send their children to previously 
White schools. Children in township schools have 
moved to formerly Indian and Coloured schools 
which are more affordable, and the children of 
domestic workers and other township children 
attend the suburban schools on fee exemption, the 
latter paying a considerable transport cost. It 
presents a complex picture of a mobile learner 
population, exercising limited choice in terms of 
affordability. Thus, wealth, mobility and hot 
knowledge allow parents, middle-class teachers and 
government officials to send their children to 
advantaged ex-Model C schools. This racial hopping 
reveals another paradox in the South African 
context: that is, racial desegregation has only 
occurred in wealthy and richer quintile schools and 
among the wealthy classes of the previously 



























Figure 1 Enrolment per quintile per race (DBE, Republic of South Africa, 2015) 
 
The narrative and policy trajectory of school 
governance and funding in the South African 
context reveal an institutionally bifurcated education 
system, both as a consequence but also as a premise 
of policy in which the poor, mainly Black 
population, is schooled in under-resourced and 
dysfunctional schools, largely in former township 
schools (about 80%), while the wealthy have access 
to semi-private public schools (ex-Model C schools) 
that primarily serve the White population and the 
new Black elite. It would seem that, perhaps 
contrary to intent, legislation around education has 
facilitated access to very differently resourced 
schools for different socio-economic groups. The 
policy has effectively secured admittance to and 
control of what were White schools for the children 
of the new middle class, a situation referred to as 
Middle Class Fee Clustering (Ahmed & Sayed, 
2009; Sayed, 2003). This has positive implications 
for school governance capacity in these schools. 
 
Three Reasons Why Equity and Redress have not 
been Fully Realised 
In this section, we turn our attention to the reasons 
why the policy commitment to equity and redress in 
South African school education has not been fully 
realised in the anticipated ways. There are three sets 
of arguments advanced to explain this policy gap, 
involving the disjuncture between intention and 
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governance and funding policies have 
conceptualised notions of equity and redress and 
consequently their multiple, contested and 
contradictory policy operationalisation. 
The second set of reasons has to do with how 
the South African polity replicates a large federal 
system with strong and unequal provinces. While 
they do not have tax appropriation and spend 
functions, provinces nonetheless have control over 
the operationalisation of schools. 
The third set of reasons has to do with the 
failure to conceive of the implementation realities of 
a set of policies which are ambitious in scope, far 
reaching in scale and spread over a vastly unequal 
27,000-strong school system with almost 12 million 
learners in a society in which the legacy of a colonial 
and apartheid past runs deep. The forward mapping 
of the policy makers rubs against the bottom-up 
institutional realities of schools located in 
marginalised, disadvantaged, spatially segmented 
and unequal neighbourhoods. 
 
Conceptualisation of equity and redress: Equity, 
rectification and equalisation, but not redistribution 
The first set of reasons has to do with the conceptual 
unpinning of the notion of equity and redress in 
educational governance and funding policy. Equity 
and redress, key framing assumptions of the 
policies, are conceptualised as equalisation of 
expenditure, which means spending less on 
operating expenses of some public schools that 
charge fees (approximately 40% of all schools after 
the introduction of no-fee schools in 2006). The 
notion of equity in policy is not redistributive in 
nature: it does not fundamentally redistribute human 
resources, physical infrastructure or teacher salaries 
across the system. It merely uses a weak notion of 
redistribution as rectification in which it seeks to 
right the racially skewed unequal education 
expenditure under apartheid (equalisation). In 
theory, cutting back on the marginal cost of some 
public schools suggests that such resources become 
available to poorer public schools. However, the 
level of these resources and how they are distributed 
require further investigation. Notwithstanding 
efforts to level the resource playing field, there are 
still considerable discrepancies in terms of how well 
qualified teachers are distributed, the capacity of 
SGBs to effectively oversee and administer schools 
and manage various aspects of non-personnel 
related funding. Ultimately, these differences are 
manifested institutionally, in outcomes for schools 
which closely correspond to levels of affluence 
within the community and for individual learners 
affected by household poverty and wealth inequality 
(Ahmed & Sayed, 2009; Motala, 2009). 
More fundamentally, the argument that 
equalisation of expenditure and reducing operating 
cost resource allocation to wealthier schools provide 
equity is tempered if private contributions pending 
are factored into the equation, as the following tables 
shows. The data below reveal that the loss of income 
by wealthier, semi-private schools is compensated 
by private input from school fees, resulting in a 
lower learner-educator ratio (LER), a more 
expansive curriculum offering, better educational 
facilities, and better support – to name but a few 
advantages accruing to wealthy parents from the 
current system – which translate into better learning 
outcomes and school performance. 
 
Table 1 Disaggregated funding source by quintile (per learner) (DBE, 2016, 2017a; Western Cape Education 
Department, 2017) 
Quintile Non-personnel Personnel Fees Total 
1 1,065 9,443 989 R11,497 
2 1,028 7,938 1,262 R10,228 
3 1,023 7,810 571 R9,404 
4 817 7,796 2,201 R10,814 
5 282 8,176 12,039 R20,498 
 
Table 1 above shows that while state 
expenditure is fairly equitable across public 
schooling, and thereby the provision of racial equity 
as well, private contributions distort funding levels 
(Motala, 2009; Sayed & Motala, 2012). Particularly 
in wealthier provinces, funds provided by 
stakeholders, mainly parents, distinguish schools 
within the public sector. Thus, while equity in 
education rectifies some form of inequity at the 
margins, for obvious political and policy reasons it 
leaves unchanged the privilege that wealthier 
schools have accrued as a result of the colonial and 
apartheid legacy. This rectification approach to 
equity in education is arguably a hallmark of the 
post-apartheid transformation strategy which, as 
many commentators have argued, fails to provide 
for strong forms of social justice in which active 
forms of redistribution and justice are pursued. 
It is evident that LERs are significantly more 
favourable in wealthier schools (Table 2). In looking 
at state-paid employees, the disparity in learner 
educator ratios is not particularly large and in most 
cases quite pro-poor. Once SGB-paid educators are 
taken into consideration, however, a pattern of much 
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Table 2 LERs by province (including paid by SGB) (DBE, 2016, 2017b) 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Eastern Cape (EC) 30.2 26.9 32.1 23.2 19.7 
Free State (FS) 24.7 30.9 30.3 24.8 21.3 
Gauteng Province (GP) 38.6 38.7 38.0 36.1 27.9 
Kwa Zulu Natal (KZN) 29.8 30.8 33.4 31.8 26.4 
Limpopo Province (LP) 30.9 31.6 33.0 26.7 23.8 
Mpumalanga Province (MP) 30.8 31.8 32.6 32.1 26.8 
Northern Cape (NC) 32.0 33.4 33.7 30.8 29.7 
North West (NW) 32.6 33.4 34.1 23.6 23.9 
Western Cape (WC) 30.4 35.4 35.4 34.5 23.8 
 
Not only do SGBs in wealthier schools have 
the financial capacity to be flexible in arranging 
staffing, but they traditionally attract the best 
qualified candidates too. This results in funding 
imbalances given the higher salary levels of more 
highly qualified teachers and the fact that educator 
salaries comprise the single largest component of 
school budgets. This perpetuates patterns of 
inequality in the level of educator quality. Figure 2 
reveals the disparity in terms of teacher 
qualifications between the top two quintiles and the 
rest. In each province, the staffing profile for schools 
in the most affluent neighbourhoods invariably 
records better qualified teachers than schools in poor 
areas. Gauteng has the least pro-rich gradient of 
teacher qualification, with quintiles 1 to 4, on 
average, reporting the same levels of educator 
qualification. The gap between average educator 
qualification in quintile 5 and non-fee charging 
schools is, quite interestingly, the lowest among the 
provinces. The highly qualified educators continue 























Figure 2 Inequalities in Relative Education Qualification Value (REQV) level by quintile and province (DBE, 
2016, 2017a) 
 
The level of physical and mental health support 
staff for schools is also widely unequal by province 
(Table 3). The poorest provinces have the fewest 
health staff per capita learner. The holistic support 
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Table 3 Health staff per learner by province (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2012) 
Province Psychologists Therapists Social workers Professional nurses Other Total 
EC 12 34 0 4 10 60 
FS 7 49 18 12 1 87 
GP 0 512 0 0 0 512 
KZN 16 86 11 26 52 191 
LP 0 1 0 5 1 7 
MP 5 5 7 4 15 36 
NC 0 2 1 0 0 3 
NW 1 13 0 7 31 52 
WC 49 24 49 45 49 216 
Total 90 726 86 103 159 1,164 
 
The Gordian knot of federalism and devolution 
While the national DBE (known as DoE prior to 
2009) established broad-based norms and policies, 
the actual implementation in schools is a provincial 
responsibility. Moreover, aside from a few 
conditional grants that are ear-marked for specific 
funding priorities, tax resources are distributed as 
block grants to provinces without any form of ring 
fencing for education or other social sectors through 
the equitable share formula (ESF) calculated with 
the following weights: education (48%); health 
(27%); basic components (17%) (derived from each 
province’s share of the national population); 
institutional (5%); and poverty (3%). Despite the 
allocations indicated in the ESF, each province is 
responsible for how much funding is provided to 
schools and this includes any subsidies provided to 
fee-charging schools or for independent schools. 
While there is arguably management merit in 
such an arrangement, the reality is that all provinces 
are not equal in the distribution of schooling 
resources, as the table below clarifies. Further, if 
equity and redress are core policy priorities, that 
presumes a need for a form of redistribution of 
education resources not only within provinces, but 
between provinces. What the data in the table below 
reveal is that while the ESF accommodates 
provincial variations and poverty, the funds raised 
by provincial taxes on a wealthy tax base far outstrip 
the redistributive mechanism of the poverty 
component of the ESF. Provinces such as the WC 
are able to spend more per learner, but their 
education budget comprises a much smaller share of 
their overall budget. As a result, poor province net 
incomes remain significantly lower than that of 
wealthier provinces, despite the ESF intention to 
redistribute taxes raised across provinces equitably 
(Motala & Carel, 2019). One consequence is that 
provincial allocations per learner vary widely, as 
illustrated in the Table 4 below. What is committed 
by the ESF and what is allocated at the provincial 
level differ drastically. 
 
Table 4 Average provincial allocations per learner, 
2017/18 (DBE, Republic of South Africa, 
2017a) 












There are wide discrepancies in per-learner 
allocations by province. For example, in the 
2017/2018 academic year, Gauteng spent 10% more 
per learner than the EC. Moreover, as is clear from 
the ratio of fee-paying to non-fee-paying schools, 
there are considerable and historic inequalities at the 
provincial level. The data in Table 5 illustrate great 
variation in the socio-economic status of provinces. 
Limpopo and the EC have 98% and 96% non-fee 
charging schools, respectively; whereas the WC and 
Gauteng have 56% and 48% fee-charging schools, 
respectively. In terms of learner population, only 3% 
of learners in Limpopo are in quintile 5 schools, 
whereas 34.2% of learners in the WC attend quintile 
5 schools. 
 
Table 5 Percentage of schools in each quintile by province (DBE, Republic of South Africa, 2017a) 
 
Quintile Non-fee charging Fee charging 
1 2 3 4 5 Q1–3 Q4–5 
EC 36% 29% 31% 2% 2% 96% 4% 
FS 49% 17% 19% 7% 8% 85% 15% 
GP 15% 12% 25% 18% 30% 52% 48% 
KZN 32% 30% 20% 10% 8% 83% 18% 
LP 40% 42% 16% 1% 2% 98% 2% 
MP 31% 27% 21% 12% 9% 79% 21% 
NC 37% 18% 19% 11% 15% 73% 27% 
NW 36% 21% 34% 8% 1% 91% 9% 
WC 19% 11% 13% 23% 34% 44% 56% 
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Inadequacy of redress and equity mechanisms in 
governance and funding policy 
Arguably, failure of the governance and funding 
policies to achieve equity and redress has to do with 
the mechanism of policy and its implementation. For 
example, one unsurprising scholarly consensus is 
that the quintile ranking on which much of the policy 
rests, based on proxy measures of community 
poverty in which a school is located, is a blunt and 
poorly targeted mechanism for achieving equity, 
requiring review (Ahmed & Sayed, 2009; Hatch, 
Buckner & Omoeva, 2017; Sayed & Soudien, 2005; 
Van Dyk & White, 2019). More fundamentally, 
even where there is a more refined measure of 
poverty and inequality, this policy only operates on 
the margin: its equity effects are limited to marginal 
operating costs (Sayed, 2016). 
More importantly, the implementing 
mechanisms of the policy, in particular the charging 
of fees, were devolved to SGBs and parents. As 
such, the decision to provide fee exemption and the 
communication of such exemption are left to self-
interested middle-class parents and schools. The 
reality, as Veriava (2005) points out, is that many 
SGBs will not provide such exemptions unless they 
are compelled to do so. For example, in the 2018 
General Household Survey (GHS) well under 1% of 
learners report receiving a fee exemption (0.4% of 
learners). If we limit the sample to public, fee-
charging schools, 2.1% receive fee exemptions and 
1.0% receive bursaries (Statistics South Africa, 
2019). Similarly, Fiske and Ladd, in their 2004 
review, noted that just 2.5% of families with 
children in primary school and 3.7% of families with 
children in high school received fee exemptions. 
These figures illustrate the fact that it is not in the 
interest of self-serving SGBs to grant fee exemption 
as the policy intends. 
Devolving school governance in a spatially 
segmented, unequal society creates a context in 
which the experiences of the rich and poor across 
race and gender divides do not have common points 
of experiential intersection. Further, the policies 
assume benevolence on the part of middle-class 
actors and that activated behaviours in managing the 
policy at the school level would result in common 
good outcomes. Unsurprisingly, this has not been 
the case. The Cuba case, for example, demonstrates 
that achieving equity is not only structural but 
requires changing the dispositions and 
understanding of individuals who enter a society 
marked by the long shadow of privilege and 
oppression. Additionally, the model of governance 
assumes that there is indeed capacity equally 
distributed across 27,000 schools to manage the 
devolved power granted. This is not the case. The 
idea of representation as social justice rings hollow 
in SGBs with limited capacity and resources. 
Notwithstanding the intention to achieve 
equity, in reality the no-fee school policy has not 
realised equity (Hatch et al., 2017; Nordstrum, 
2012). At best, governance and funding policies, 
including no-fee school policies, could be described 
as pro-poor (Hatch et al., 2017) and while seeking to 
rectify the most egregious effects of apartheid, are 
not fundamentally able to redistribute for social 
justice purposes. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
We argue that achieving equity and redress in 
governance and funding policies is a wicked 
problem: more than 26 years after the end of 
apartheid, inequities between rich and poor and 
between different groups persist. The binding 
constraint, it is argued, has been the way in which 
the policies reviewed in this paper has 
conceptualised equity and redress and the 
mechanisms instituted to operationalise the 
achievement of such goals. It is this complex 
relationship between policy conceptualisation and 
policy implementation within the context of 
historical inequalities that has shaped the 
educational terrain. 
From the review, it is evident that SGBs, as a 
key mechanism for equity in policy, continue to 
befuddle attempts to achieve equity in redistribution 
and representation, not only mirroring but 
exacerbating the societal divides of inequality and 
reflecting a bifurcated education system. Neither in 
terms of policy scope nor policy implementation 
have they unfolded as sites of representation and 
redress. Crucial to these inequities are, as argued, the 
differential capacities of SGBs to lead and manage 
school affairs, sharpened and rendered more visible 
during the COVID-19 period. 
Further, we note that the way in which equity 
is addressed in its operationalisation rests on a weak 
quintile modelling system and a less than robust 
equitable share formula. We found that the policies 
do not tackle inequity in personnel expenditure. 
Equity is only applied to non-personnel expenditure, 
failing to tackle redress in human resources 
(teachers), which arguably explains much of the 
differentiation within the school system. As such, 
we found, similar to others, that the mechanisms of 
equity must be reconsidered. 
Using Fraser’s framework, we argue for a 
much stronger redistributive form of equity within 
the current fee charging and no-fee charging school 
governance system advocating for what is called a 
pro-redistributive Fifth Option, a redistributive 
scheme for public school governance and financing 
which promotes and protects the idea of a common 
good and ideal for education. In the model proposed 
below, we consider equity as active redistribution 
and we rethink some of the ways in which the 
operationalisation of SASA and the NNSSF can be 
altered to affect a more robust form of redress. 
The core starting point of the model is to 
develop a clear and defensible notion of equity with 
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social justice at its core. The notion of social justice 
in this paper is orientated to an understanding of 
representation and redistribution as integral to 
addressing inequality, which in the South African 
case would imply redistributing resources and 
privileges from the privileged to the less privileged. 
The suggestion offered in this paper begins from this 
premise. 
Secondly, it is premised that adequate state 
funding is available to achieve schooling equity. The 
debates on funding adequacy have been well 
discussed over an extended period (Fiske & Ladd, 
2004; Motala & Carel, 2019). Without it, financial 
shortfalls will undermine development in and 
through education. Adequate financing is needed to 
provide dysfunctional schools with the 
infrastructure and facilities for a sound learning 
environment, according to clear norms and 
standards. Such measures should address the 
historical infrastructural backlogs of colonisation 
and apartheid which to date have not been fully 
addressed in the South African context. In 
attempting to administer a differentiated and 
regulated return to school in the lockdown 3 phase 
in South Africa, the biggest stumbling block 
continues to be the poor infrastructure of 
disadvantaged schools – inadequate toilets and 
running water, doors and windows that need repair, 
and an absence of sufficient hygiene resources such 
as soaps and toiletries. 
Thirdly, it is argued that it may be politically 
necessary to allow governing bodies to charge 
additional user fees with all the qualifications that 
have already been stated in SASA. The system 
proposed would, for example, top-slice 15% of 
every additional South African rand raised by 
governing bodies that choose to administer user 
fees. This should be placed into a development fund 
by a local cluster of schools, as in, for example, 
Zones of Pedagogic Influence in Mozambique, with 
the express purpose of effecting redress. This is 
referred to as the “redress fund.” The possibility 
exists for those governing bodies that charge fees to 
access these funds if they can justify that the funds 
will be used for educational upgrading. This 
proposal is a form of taxing historical privileges, 
which is also a strong form of Fraser’s notion of 
redistribution.vii In addition, there needs to be a 
proactive redress and equity strategy involving 
measures such as sharing teachers across schools 
which, as noted above, are an important source of 
inequity in the current system. For instance, the 
Personnel Administrative Measures can be revised 
to allow for more than the current 5% redress posts, 
shifting much needed personnel resources to the 
poorest schools. 
The main implication of this analysis is that the 
failure of the education governance policies are not 
simply, as often argued, a matter of implementation 
failure. We argue that they are a failure of the 
conceptualisation of policies. This suggest, as 
discussed in this paper, the need to fundamentally 
revise and rewrite the education governance policies 
(SASA and NNSSF specifically). In addition, policy 
makers at various levels as well as practitioners need 
to pursue active redistribution strategies as outlined 
in this paper. Such changes at the level of policy and 
practice must be accompanied by engagement with 
the beliefs, views and actions of individual SGBs in 
the current cooperative devolved governance model, 
both at provincial and institutional levels. These 
cooperative governance changes should be 
accompanied by a change in the way the current soft 
zoning policy is implemented and consideration of 
global models of equity, such as the Right to 
Education (RTE) Act in India, which reserves a 
quarter of all places for disadvantaged students. 
While we argue that changes have the potential 
to elevate equity in education, caution must be 
exercised as education changes on their own cannot 
address the deeply embedded structural dimensions 
of inequality in South Africa. The long march to a 
more egalitarian society and inclusive economic 
growth in South Africa also requires addressing 
inequities more broadly, including the spatial and 
segmented nature of South African society. As the 
COVID-19 pandemic has so clearly illustrated, 
education inequities mirror inequality in all areas of 
South African life. This has been especially relevant 
in schools, were access to data, digital platforms and 
computers determined whether teaching and 
learning could continue and the social divides in our 
society became more obvious and relevant, both 
between the public and private schools and within 
the public schooling sector. The policy pitfalls and 
gaps highlighted in this paper are instructive for 
other countries with similar social and economic 
challenges as they seek to develop transformative 
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Notes 
i. The notions of “state at centre” and “state at sites” are 
used in the descriptive sense of specifying the 
relationships of government set up by the Constitution 
which has carved South Africa into nine provinces. A 
fuller exploration of the notion of the state and civil 
society is developed in an earlier paper by Carrim and 
Sayed (1993). 
ii. A review of notions of choice and participation in a 
market reveal two dimensions of the debate. The first is 
the advocacy, elaboration and critiques by researchers of 
either market or democratic egalitarian approaches to 
educational choice and provision. Secondly, researchers 
working in the empirical tradition (qualitative and 
quantitative) are engaged in determining issues such as 
how choice occurs, whether more choice results from 
greater deregulation through markets and whether 
markets result in privileging of some and greater 
inequity. 
iii. The 2006 review of the South African Schools Act of 
1996 and the subsequent amendment to the NNSSF, still 
requires parents in quintiles 4 and 5 schools to contribute 
to schools to top up school funding. Partial or full 
exemption from fees can be granted, on application, 
based on a needs assessment. In contrast, students in 
quintiles 1 to 3 schools are exempt from paying any such 
fees. 
iv. Notwithstanding the amended policy, the reality is that 
quintile 5 schools find ways of excluding poor learners 
such as insisting on parents’ bank statements and salary 
slips, which the amendments make illegal, but which are 
used to exclude those who cannot pay the fees. 
v. In general, such schools can only spend their money 
through provincial education departments (PEDs). All 
resources must be procured through the PED, which 
means that they pay much more for everything. For 
example, if the school needs a computer, a Section 21 
school will purchase directly through a retail store where 
a Section 20 school must follow state procurement 
policies, which typically result in such goods being more 
costly. 
vi. To date, it is unclear how this idea of redress as a savings 
by the state on schools which charge fees operates. 
Personal inquiries by the author to the state have not 
divulged how monies the state saves are used for redress 
purposes. 
vii. This option draws from a paper first published by Sayed 
in 2003 in a Journal of Education Planning and 
Administration (JEPA) book. 
viii. All data except the Persal dataset are available to the 
public at the links provided in the References section 
below. Permission to use the Persal payroll data in the 
study was received from the DBE for an earlier chapter 
that Shireen Motala and David Carel (2019) worked on 
and was extended for this article as well. 
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